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Perfectionism, paternalism and liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s capability 
approach  
 
Séverine Deneulin1 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the theoretical foundations of human development policies as 
found in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to development, and to examine to what 
extent undertaking policies according to the capability approach respects people’s freedom to 
pursue their own conception of the good. The paper argues that policies undertaken according to 
the capability approach have to be guided by a perfectionist conception of the good, that is, they 
cannot avoid promoting one certain conception of the human good. Such a perfectionist 
conception of the human good, and the policies ensuing from it, have often been qualified as 
paternalist, depriving the human being of choosing her own conception of the good. The paper 
examines to what extent those fears of paternalism that seem to underlie policies guided by a 
perfectionist account of the good are legitimate, and to what extent the capability approach can 
escape those charges of paternalism and respect each person’s freedom to pursue the human good 
as she conceives it. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Born from the successive failures of different theories of development to improve living 
conditions for all, a new development paradigm emerged in the 1990s, human development. 
Human development has been defined as ‘both the process of widening people’s choices and 
the level of their achieved well-being’ (UNDP, 1990, p.9), a level of well-being that included, 
among others, access to income, a long healthy life, education, political freedom, guaranteed 
human rights, concern for the environment, concern for participation (UNDP, 1990, p. 1). The 
vision and purpose of human development is ‘to secure the freedom, well-being and dignity 
of all’ (UNDP, 2000, p. 1).  
Even though the objective of human development policies is to enlarge the 
possibilities of choice in all areas,2 even though human development is ‘a process of 
enhancing human capabilities – to expand choices and opportunities so that each person can 
lead a life of respect and value’ (UNDP, 2000, p. 2), some choices seem to be more privileged 
than others. For example, literacy is always promoted, gender equality is always considered 
as good, living in a non-polluted environment is always desirable, the absence of freedom of 
expression is never considered a good, the destruction of a cultural heritage or the 
disappearance of a minority language is never considered as desirable, and alcohol or drug 
consumption never seem to be things that are to be promoted. Human development policies 
thus seem to leave little room for the freedom of each human being to pursue her own 
conception of the good. If people are to be able ‘to lead lives of respect and value’, it seems 
that there exist prior choices that are independent of people’s choices and values; these 
choices need to be promoted as the fundamental basis for a life of respect and value. 
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University of Cambridge). I thank the participants for their comments. 
2 Human development ‘enables all individuals to enlarge their human capabilities to the full and to put those 
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  The paper will be structured as follows. I will first examine the theoretical 
foundations of human development policies as found in Sen’s capability approach to 
development, and will argue that, despite Sen’s concern for the freedom of each individual to 
frame her own conception of the good (by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings 
and by avoiding to identify valuable capabilities that development policies ought to promote), 
implementing  his capability approach in terms of human development policies ends up being 
more paternalist and perfectionist than his theory claims to be. I will then focus on 
Nussbaum’s understanding of the capability approach as she framed it within the context of 
an Aristotelian social democracy. I argue that her approach is more sincere than Sen’s in the 
sense that it offers explicitly a perfectionist theory of the good (it recognises explicitly what 
capabilities are valuable to promote), but runs into the same problems as Sen’s approach by 
focusing on capabilities rather than functionings. In the last few years, Nussbaum modified 
her position and now assimilates the capability approach within the context of Rawlsian 
political liberalism. I will try to show that putting the capability approach within the 
framework of a Rawlsian political liberalism is inconsistent with the objective of human 
development (i.e., giving the adequate opportunities and incentives for each human being to 
live a full human life). There are three main reasons for this. First, policies based on the 
capability approach, even though framed within the context of political liberalism, 
unavoidably entails ‘paternalist’ policies. Second, the domain of justice cannot be held ‘for 
political purposes only’ in the Rawlsian sense of the term. Third, capabilities cannot be 
assimilated to rights, rather, they are to be assimilated to obligations to meet. The paper 
concludes by underlining the risk of confusing concern for the respect of freedom with 
indifference.  
Before examining whether the fears of paternalism justify a non-perfectionist capability 
approach, a few definitions are in order. 
Perfectionism is a moral theory which regards certain activities, like knowledge, health 
or artistic creation as good, independent of any subjectivity. Their presence makes life better, 
whether one desires them or not, and their absence impoverishes human life (Hurka, 1998). 
The foundational idea of perfectionism is that ‘we should maximize human excellence’ 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 25), a human excellence understood in terms of the properties of human life.  
According to perfectionist moral theories, ‘certain properties constitute human nature – they 
make humans humans, and the good life develops these properties to a high degree or realizes 
what is central to human nature’ (Hurka, 1993, p. 3). Perfectionism is then ‘the doctrine that 
the good or intrinsically desirable human life is one that develops to the maximal possible 
extent the properties that constitute human nature’ (Arneson, 1999, p.119). In a perfectionist 
framework, the role of the government amounts to establishing institutions (legal, economic 
and social) in which the properties that constitute human life will best be actualised. It 
amounts to ‘creating and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead 
valuable and worthwhile lives’ (Wall, 1998, p. 8). Within those institutions guaranteeing the 
perfection of all, within those conditions that will enable citizens to lead worthwhile lives, 
‘citizens are then free to concentrate on their own good’ (Hurka, 1993, p. 66).  There are of 
course many forms of perfectionism.3 The perfectionism that I retain here is a moderate 
perfectionism, where a policy has sometimes to promote some forms of human excellences 
(De Marneffe, 1998, pp. 102-103), and has sometimes to go against what the human being 
considers as good.  
In the history of philosophy, perfectionism has gathered a long support (for example 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Marx, Nietzche, Hegel all endorsed the foundational idea of 
perfectionism). But nowadays, there are fears that perfectionism is hostile to the values of 
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liberty and autonomy. There are fears that, ‘because perfectionism thinks that some lives are 
better than others, regardless of whether people want or would choose them, it favours state 
coercion to force people into excellence’ (Hurka, 1993, p. 147). As a consequence, 
perfectionism has often been assimilated to paternalism, according to which an adult’s liberty 
and autonomy can be restricted for the sake of his own good. 
Often opposed to perfectionism, liberalism is characterised by a respect of the 
freedom of people to pursue their own conception of the good, arguing that a policy that gives 
incentives for people to live in a certain way, the way that most perfects human life, threatens 
the freedom of each human being to pursue the good she desires to pursue. The government 
cannot limit individual liberty by claiming that some activities are more worthy of pursuit 
than others. The state should remain neutral regarding what the good life is, and limit itself to 
‘promoting the general welfare of the citizens by providing them the resources they need in 
order to lead lives of their own choosing’ (Kraut, 1999, p. 315). Each individual is the best 
judge of what is good for her, and one should not interfere with individual choices, unless her 
choice infringes on someone else’s freedom. This is known as Mill’s non-harm principle: 
‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant’ (Mill, 1859, p. 223). I assimilate thus here liberalism as a 
form of anti-paternalism (though that assimilation is quite reductive)4 that asserts that the 
government cannot limit the freedom of adults to pursue what they consider as good.  
 
2. Perfectionism, paternalism and liberalism in Sen 
 
Sen’s capability approach considers well-being in terms of functionings, that is, what 
people are or do, like being healthy, reading or writing, taking part in the life of the 
community, and more specifically in terms of capabilities, that is, what people are able to be 
or do, like being able to be healthy, being able to read and write (see for example Sen, 1980, 
1985 a,b, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1999). A capability is ‘a person’s ability to do valuable acts or 
reach valuable states of being’ it ‘represents the alternative combinations of things a person is 
able to do or be’ (Sen, 1993, p. 30), and thus refers to various alternative combinations of 
functionings anyone of which the person chooses to have. Development, in the capability 
framework, amounts to expanding the basic capabilities that ‘people have reason to choose 
and value’ (Sen, 1989, 1999). 
In that sense, Sen’s capability approach is an objective theory of the good, since 
quality of life evaluation implies a substantive judgement of what makes life better (Arneson, 
1999). Things or states of affairs, like being able to be healthy or being able to pursue 
knowledge, have intrinsic value, independently of whether they affect people’s subjective 
preferences.5 Things are not good because they are desired but because they are part of an 
objective conception of human flourishing. 
Yet, Sen deliberately avoids identifying the capabilities that are valuable to promote. 
Sen (1988, p. 18) asserts that his approach to development as basic capabilities expansion 
only ‘specifies a space in which evaluation is to take place, rather than proposing one 
particular formula for evaluation’. He emphasises that, eventually, the choice of relevant 
capabilities has to be related to the underlying social concerns and values.  
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5 Sen has repeatedly stressed that deprived and oppressed people often adapt themselves to their situations, and 
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Sen gives a reason for not specifying what is to be counted as relevant capabilities: his 
concern for pluralism. First, the different functionings vary in importance and priority, and 
second the capability approach does not claim to contain an exhaustive evaluation of what is 
relevant for well-being (rules and procedures can for example be as important as freedoms 
and outcomes, see Sen, 1999, pp. 76-80) The capability approach thus does not pretend to 
contain an exhaustive evaluation of what is relevant to promote. Capabilities are not based on 
fundamental ‘excellences’ of human life. In that sense, Sen is a liberal, and shares with Rawls 
the respect of people’s freedom to choose their own conception of the good.6 Both 
acknowledge the fact that people have different ends and that this must be respected, the 
difference between Sen and Rawls is that Sen puts the emphasis on what primary goods do to 
people, since two persons with the same finality might need different amounts of primary 
goods (Sen, 1999, pp. 70-74).  
If no content can be given to what people have reason to choose and value, if one 
refuses to take any position regarding the ends that are to be promoted, how then can we 
know which opportunities have to be given to people in order to improve their quality of life? 
How can we give people conditions for a better human life, without knowing what that better 
life consists of? Sen (1992, p. 44) acknowledges that ‘there is no escape from the problem of 
evaluation in selecting a class of functionings – and in the corresponding description of 
capabilities’.  If selecting the relevant capabilities and functionings remains an unsolved 
problem, if no content can be given to what people have reason to value, then we may wonder 
how Sen’s capability approach can offer a relevant framework for evaluating whether people 
have really been given the opportunities to exercise the capabilities they have reason to value 
(Desai, 1990; Qizilbash, 1996a,b; Sugden, 1993; Srinivisan, 1994). 
Despite its intention to propose a non-perfectionist and liberal approach, Sen’s 
capability approach becomes perfectionist when it comes to implementing policies, in the 
sense that some content must be given to the relevant capabilities to promote.7 By  refraining 
from advancing a particular conception of the good at the theoretical level, it seems that the 
capability approach, at the implementation level, lands in the position of adopting a particular 
stance about what constitutes a good human life.  
Not taking a particular stance about values (in this case, the value of what counts as a 
good human life) has been a well-rooted ambition of the ‘science’ of economics, an ambition 
left as a legacy by the logical positivists (Putnam, 2002; Walsh, 1996). Hilary Putnam (1981, 
1990) has long argued that the attempt of building a value-free social science has been a failed 
enterprise, given the fallacy of the fact/value dichotomy— scientific statements being 
                                                 
6 Rawls’s theory of justice is based on the assumption that, in liberal democracies, ‘equal citizens have different 
and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable conceptions of the good’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 303). The goal of 
Rawls’s political liberalism is to find a political conception of justice which people with different conceptions of 
the good can endorse, a political conception that will be ‘an overlapping consensus’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 134) 
between those different conceptions.  Using the device of the ‘original position’ (Rawls, 1971, §3-4, 1993, p. 22) 
where people are under a veil of ignorance, that is, ‘the parties [in the original position] are not allowed to know 
the social position of those they represent, or the particular comprehensive doctrine of the person each represent’ 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 24), Rawls establishes a list of primary goods. Those goods are necessary for people to 
conceive and pursue whatever their conception of the good: ‘We stipulate that the parties [in the original 
position] evaluate the available principles [the principles of justice that will better protect the different 
conceptions of the good] by estimating how well they secure the primary goods essential to realize the higher-
order interests [i.e. the conception of the good] of the person for whom each acts as a trustee’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 
75). Those primary goods are (Rawls, 1993, p. 181): a) basic rights and liberties; b) freedom of movement, 
freedom of association and freedom of occupational choice against a background of diverse opportunities; c) 
powers and prerogatives of office and positions of responsibility in political and economic institutions of the 
basic structure; d) income and wealth and finally; e) the social bases of self-respect.  
7 For a similar claim that Sen’s capability approach, though not explicitly perfectionist, points towards 
perfectionism, see Arneson, 2000, pp. 46-7. 
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‘empirically verifiable’, and value judgements being ‘unverifiable’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 143). 
Although those should be distinguished, they should not be dichotomised. Fact and value 
judgements, descriptive and evaluative concerns, remain deeply ‘entangled’ (Putnam, 2002). 
Yet, Sen’s capability approach explicitly stands firm in holding a heavily value-laden 
approach to economics where the fact/value dichotomy does not hold (Sen, 1987; Putnam 
2002). As Walsh (2000, p.6) states it, the capability theory is right from the beginning ‘black 
with fact, white with convention and red with values.’8 Thus, Sen’s capability approach does 
not fall prey to the criticism that, on the ground of building a value free science, it hides 
(disputed values) behind the formalism on which the theory is built. But could the claim be 
made that, behind its refusal to take a stand on what the (disputed value) of the good life is, 
the capability approach hides unavowed positions about the good, positions that it can no 
longer hide when the theoretical framework becomes practice? It seems so. 
Not only does the implementation of the capability approach make it perfectionist, it 
also makes it paternalist; it is practically impossible to respect the freedom of people to seize 
or not seize opportunities because to evaluate the success of development policies, one has to 
focus on functionings and not on capabilities. If the government aims at basic capabilities, 
aims at creating a context in which a person might live well and choose a flourishing life, then 
how can we assess if a country succeeded at giving people the necessary opportunities to 
function well except by looking at how people are functioning, for freedom cannot easily be 
observed unless it has been exercised? How can we observe whether the refusal to make use 
of given opportunities is the result of a free choice or the result of internalised beliefs or social 
norms. If women refuse to go to the literacy classes that are offered to them, how can we 
observe whether that refusal is the result of free choice or of internalised beliefs that being 
educated is unsuitable for women? 
Sen himself confesses that, given data restrictions and the difficulties of evaluating the 
exercise of freedom, one will often have to focus on the observed functionings, on the 
observed exercise of freedoms. The aim of development policies seems thus not as much to 
provide the opportunities for each human being to exercise the capabilities she will choose to 
exercise, but to make people function in one way or another. If for example, in a country, the 
majority of people eat chips, pizzas, beer, popcorn, what would the capability approach say 
about such a situation? If policies in that country are undertaken on the basis of the capability 
approach, they would take as a starting point the observation that there is a lack of 
functionings in matters of health and nutrition (obesity, high rate of cardio-vascular diseases), 
and most probably policies would aim at promoting one type of alimentation-- restricting 
people’s freedom to be fed as they want. Sen would perhaps reply that putting functionings as 
the goal of public policies instead of capabilities is not a problem, insofar as the democratic 
principles in a society have decided that those functionings were to be promoted.9 So, if a 
campaign regarding bad eating habits is legitimate, it is because the underlying social 
concerns and values of that society (that have been reflected through public debate and 
democratic principles) regard health as too important as to be related to individual choices. 
Yet, analysing public policies goals only in terms of the outcomes of public debate also 
generates concerns. For example, if the democratic principles in a country decide that the 
government should not interfere in matters of television programmes, that it is up to the 
                                                 
8 Walsh (2000) qualifies this explicit re-acceptance of values within economics ‘the second phase of classical 
economics’, after the first-phase of classical economists (neo-classical economists, what he calls the 
‘minimalists’) flushed out the hidden values behind their formalism. In the line of Adam Smith, Sen reconciled 
economic analysis with deep ethical judgements. 
9 Also, Sen makes the argument that, with regard to some capabilities such as the capability to leave in a malaria-
free environment, policies aiming at promoting the functioning rather than the capability are not a problem 
insofar as anyone would anyway choose to live in a malaria-free environment. 
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parents to prevent their children from watching violent movies and not the government’s 
business, is that democratic decision legitimate, since it has been shown that there is a high 
correlation between watching violence on TV and violence in the real world? Is a decision 
legitimate because it is the result of democratic processes, or is it legitimate because that 
decision is good and contributes to a better human life for all?10 
Another difficulty with the focus on capabilities is the problem of incentives. Take the 
example of environmental policies. If giving people the opportunity to live in a non-polluted 
environment is more important than actually living in a non-polluted environment, this focus 
is not enough to enhance people’s capabilities to live in a clean environment. What is needed 
in addition to the opportunities is incentives. It is not sufficient that the government provides 
recycling areas, but also that it gives incentives for people to recycle. What matters is not only 
‘making choices available to people’ but also ‘changing the incentives offered to them’ 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 317). And by giving incentives to act in a certain way, a policy restricts 
the freedom of adults to behave the way they choose to. For example if someone chooses to 
have a bad health by choosing to smoke and to drink alcohol, then his freedom to choose the 
way he wants to live is highly restricted given the high incentives that public policies 
generally put to enhance people to lead healthy lives. If he cannot smoke in public, if 
cigarettes and alcohol are highly expensive, if he is unable to go to a pub after 11 p.m., etc., 
then his freedom is restricted, and public policies act paternalistically by giving incentives to 
people to choose a lifestyle against their own choice. Though paternalism is a word we accept 
with great difficulty in theory, ‘it is equally difficult to avoid in practice’ (New, 1999, p. 63). 
 
3. Perfectionism, paternalism and liberalism in Nussbaum 
 
a) Aristotelian social democracy 
 
Martha Nussbaum is more direct than Sen, in putting forward a perfectionist 
conception of the human good that development policies ought to be promoting. Nussbaum 
notes that, the capability approach will encounter the same deficiencies as the desire approach 
to quality of life if no effort is made at specifying further the functionings and capabilities that 
are valuable to be promoted, ‘just as people can be taught not to want or miss the things their 
culture has taught them they should not or could not have, so too they can be taught not to 
value certain functionings as constituents of their good living’ (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 175). As 
the choice of what is valuable and relevant can be the product of structures of inequalities and 
discrimination, Nussbaum goes beyond the deliberate incompleteness of Sen’s approach, 
through elaborating an objective list of capabilities. On the basis of Aristotle’s internalist 
essentialism, which is ‘an historically grounded empirical essentialism taking its stand within 
human experience, it is an evaluative inquiry into what is the deepest and most indispensable 
in our lives’ (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 208), she derives fundamental experiences that all humans 
share and that can be regarded as the characteristic activities common to every human being 
and that make human life human. Insofar as we recognise human beings as humans, there 
must be an essentialist basis as to what human life consists of, as to what deprives human life 
of its full human character.  
By looking into our own human life and into other people’s lives and asking ourselves 
what are the grounding experiences that all human beings share, Nussbaum builds a list of 
human experiences that we all agree to share and find worthwhile. In these spheres of human 
experiences, the human being will respond in some way rather another, namely, she will try to 
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(1996), Cohen (1998), Estlund (1997), Richardson (2002). 
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respond the best possible way. To each sphere of human experience corresponds an 
appropriate functioning, or an appropriate way to behave with respect to that experience. 
Functionings will then be the appropriate responses, or the best way to function within the 
spheres of human experiences. For example, in the sphere of the human body, the best 
functionings will be to be healthy, to be adequately fed, and sheltered.  
Since human beings are not passive but active in shaping their own life, if freedom is 
recognised as the most important characteristic of human beings, we do not want people to 
function in some way, but we want them to be able to function in some way, we want to give 
them the opportunities to function, and let them be free to use or not those opportunities. 
Therefore, Nussbaum puts the emphasis on capabilities, on the opportunities that people have 
to function in the best possible ways in those spheres of experiences. And on the basis of 
fundamental human experiences, she sets a list of ten central human capabilities, or abilities to 
satisfy central human functionings (for the elements of her list, see Nussbaum, 1988, 1990, 
1992, 1993, 1995a, 1999, 2000b).  
Each of the central human capabilities is conceived as fundamental to each human life; 
this implies that a life that lacking any one of those capabilities will fall short of being a good 
human life. The aim of a public policy is to ensure that all the citizens live a good human life, 
to give them opportunities to function in some way, and to leave each person free to make use 
or not of those capabilities. 
Nussbaum (1990, p. 217, 1992, p. 214) qualifies her list of central human capabilities 
as ‘thick vague theory of the good’, which constitutes a perfectionist conception of the good 
that any society has the moral obligation to pursue. Nussbaum’s capability approach is 
perfectionist in the sense that the capability to be healthy, to have access to knowledge, and 
all the other capabilities of her list are to be promoted, independently of what people desire. 
Yet, Nussbaum’s perfectionism is liberal in the sense that the task of public policy is not to 
promote those ‘perfections’ of human life (functionings) but the opportunities to exercise 
those perfections, it is then up to each individual’s choice whether she shall make use or not 
of those opportunities. Because human life is what it is, constituted in a universal way of 
some fundamental characteristics, the list of central human capabilities is a normative 
political scheme, it is a guide for the evaluation of public policies in their pursuit of the good, 
in their ability to provide the conditions such that its citizens can live a full human life. Her 
theory is thick because it deals with human ends across all areas of life – ‘There is just one 
list of functionings that do in fact constitute human good living’ (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 152) – 
and vague because it allows for many concrete specifications and draws an outline sketch of 
the good life. 
Nussbaum criticizes Rawls on the grounds that, by focusing on goods themselves as 
intrinsically good, we jump over the question of what these goods can really do for people. 
Her Aristotelianism argues that the worth of primary goods ‘cannot be properly assessed if 
we do not set it in the context of a thicker theory of good living. His [Rawls’s] list omits the 
really “primary” items; and it ascribes independent significance to items whose worth can 
only be seen in connection with the truly primary items’ (Nussbaum, 1988, p.152). For 
example, it is good possessing wealth only if it leads to better functionings. If someone’s 
greater wealth leads her to have a more stressful life and bad eating habits, then having more 
wealth is not to be considered as good since it is likely to lead to more health problems. 
Though she emphasises the centrality of choice, Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism rejects Rawls’s 
position that the constituents of a good human life have to be left to the choices of individuals 
and that public policy should focus on the distribution of primary goods and leave individuals 
pursue their own conception of the good as they see it (see note 6). Her Aristotelianism 
emphasises that there are constituents to a human life that all humans share as being 
worthwhile, whether one will choose those constituents as part of one’s life or not. 
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The common point, however, is that both Rawls and Nussbaum grant primary 
importance to the freedom to make choices regarding one’s own life. The difference is that 
Nussbaum insists that primary goods are instrumental and have no intrinsic value. She insists 
that it is necessary to specify, vaguely at least, the functionings of a human life upon which 
one will be able to make choices. The objective of development policies is not only to 
distribute goods as if those goods had a value in themselves; it is also to give the 
opportunities to each human being to live in a certain way. Government policies should be 
directed at making sure that all human beings have the necessary resources and conditions for 
this, but the government should leave the choice of making use of those resources up to the 
individual. 
The perfectionism developed here by Nussbaum seems consistent with a certain form 
of liberalism. The list is vague and leaves each government free to specify the elements that a 
development policy will have to promote. Like Sen, Nussbaum emphasises the capabilities 
for functionings rather than the functionings themselves. Capabilities, instead of functionings, 
should be made the political goal because practical reason (and the freedom to choose) is 
what makes life human. She often gives the example of a person who has the opportunities 
for play. Despite a person being given the opportunities for play and leisure, she can always 
choose a workaholic life and not take her holiday. But there is a great difference between 
such a workaholic chosen life and a life constrained by insufficient maximum-hour 
protection. What matters then, as far as public policy is concerned, is to give the necessary 
opportunities so that people can have the capability to play, whether they choose to play or 
not.  
However, it is sometimes desirable that functionings and not capabilities constitute the 
goal of public policy. In some areas, it is sometimes more important to have people function 
in a certain way than it is to give them the opportunity to function in a certain way. It is 
sometimes more important to focus on the human good (functionings), rather than on the 
freedom and opportunities to realise that human good (capabilities). Freedom is not the only 
good to promote, but one good among others (see for example Arneson, 2000, pp. 59-63; 
Hurka, 1993, pp. 148-9; Finnis, 1980, p. 95; Kraut, 1999, p. 325; Raz, 1986). A focus on 
capabilities risks ignoring the full range of the components of the good life, among which 
freedom is one. Environmental problems are such an example. The aim of development 
policies is to ensure that people do live in a non-polluted environment, rather than being able 
to, should they choose or not. If an individual chooses not to live in a non-polluted 
environment, for example, by throwing her rubbish into the river instead of buying special 
recycling bags, letting that individual choose freely makes other individuals unable to live in 
a non-polluted environment. Even in the above example of the opportunities for play, many 
governments do design policies that prevent people from choosing workaholic lives by setting 
compulsory legal holiday. This might sound paternalistic and an intolerable intervention into 
an individual’s life, but such policies regarding compulsory legal holiday are the mere 
reflection that individuals do not live alone, and that their choices may impede other people’s 
ability to make choices. If public policies fail to consider play and leisure as a functioning, 
but regard it as a capability that people might choose to exercise or not, then I am afraid that 
some people will be less free to exercise it. For example, consider a company with the choice 
of hiring one of two workers, one who appreciates spending time with her family and taking 
full opportunities of her legal holidays, and the other who chooses not to have a family in 
order to dedicate herself entirely to work. Would such a context, in which the public policy 
leaves the choice up to its citizens regarding holiday, leave its citizens really free to choose 
their conception of the good? I fear that such policy would rule out, in the long run, the 
possibility to exercise the capability for play and leisure, and workers would be forced to 
choose between one conception of the good (the workaholic life) or being unemployed.  
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Given that individual choices have important consequences upon other people’s lives, 
and given that an individual never lives alone and choices are deeply interconnected with 
other people’s lives, the focus on capabilities rather than functionings as the political goal 
may lead to important losses in well-being. In economic analysis, public policy has been 
assigned the role of correcting externalities. If economic theorists who emphasise the crucial 
role of markets in bringing about human well-being recognise policy interventions that 
restrain laissez-faire to correct externalities, a capability theorist who emphasises the crucial 
role of freedom as component of human well-being should similarly recognise policy 
intervention to correct externalities and that restrain individual freedom for the greatest well-
being of all.   
 
b) Rawlsian political liberalism 
 
In the late 1990s Nussbaum radically shifted the overall horizon of her capability 
approach (Nussbaum, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999, 2000a, b). She now takes back her Aristotelian 
list of central human capabilities, and places them in a totally different context. Capabilities 
no longer exist within the framework of an Aristotelian social democracy, but now appear 
within the framework of a Rawlsian political liberalism: ‘I now understand the list of central 
human capabilities as the core of a specifically political form of liberalism, in the Rawlsian 
sense. I imagine that citizens of many different comprehensive conceptions can all endorse 
the items on this list, as things that are essential to a flourishing human life, whatever else that 
life also pursues and values. […] The starting point involves the recognition of reasonable 
disagreement about the good, and things are designed in such a way that Muslims and Jews, 
Hindus and Christians and atheists, can all endorse the political scheme as one that maximally 
protects their own freedom to plan a life course that is distinctive and different from that of 
others’ (Nussbaum, 1998b, pp. 284-285). The list is simply more comprehensive and defined 
than Rawls’s original list of primary goods, but the idea is the same: to propose goods that it 
is necessary for people to dispose of, whatever their tradition and conception of the good life, 
‘to put forward something that people from many different traditions, with many different 
fuller conceptions of the good, can agree on, as the necessary basis for pursuing their good 
life. The list of functionings is proposed as the object of a specifically political consensus’ 
(Nussbaum, 1999, p. 40). 
Nussbaum proposes a more comprehensive list than Rawls for three reasons (see 
Nussbaum, 1998a, pp. 314-6). First, individuals vary in their ability to transform primary 
goods into functionings. Second, even though resources are equally spread, hierarchical 
structures often prevent individuals from making use of those resources (in those 
circumstances, it is more adequate to ask ourselves what individuals are able to do rather than 
looking at the available resources). Third, the choice of a conception of the good is not always 
free-- remaining neutral and not interfering sometimes validates structures of oppression. 
Therefore, Nussbaum puts forward a more comprehensive list of what people are able to be or 
do rather than a list of resources, a list that ‘can be endorsed for political purposes, as the 
moral basis of central constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different 
views of what a complete good life for a human being would be’ (Nussbaum, 2000b, p. 74; 
2000a, p.124).11  
                                                 
11 In Rawls’s political liberalism, the role of the state should not be to provide the opportunities for people to 
pursue a certain type of life, a type that is judged more valuable than others, but the state should ‘seek only to 
provide a neutral framework within which people can make their own individual choices. The state must act to 
protect the rights that people have to revise and pursue their conceptions of the good, and so must rule out any 
conceptions of the good whose pursuit would violate those rights’ (Mulhall & Swift, 1996, p. 218). 
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Instead of presenting her list as a thick vague theory that constitutes a perfectionist 
conception of the good that the government (and other institutions, or individuals between 
themselves) has the moral obligation to provide, those central human capabilities are now 
assimilated to constitutional guarantees that the legislator has to provide, whatever the 
conception of the good that individuals pursue. The list of human capabilities is not grounded 
anymore on a ‘theory of human being that goes beneath politics’ (Nussbaum, 1998b, p. 
285),12 but is the result of a general consensus among different people having different 
conceptions of the good: ‘We can see the list of capabilities as like a long list of opportunities 
for life functionings, such that it is always rational to want them whatever else one wants. If 
one ends up having a plan of life that does not make use of all of them, one has hardly been 
harmed by having the chance to choose a life that does’ (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 45). Her 
capability approach so modified is argued to give more space for historical and cultural 
differences, so that people who have different conceptions of the good are respected. 
The table below summarises the main differences between Nussbaum’s ‘new’ and 
‘old’ capability approach: 
 
The capability approach within the context of an 
Aristotelian Social Democracy 
The capability approach within the context of a 
Rawlsian political liberalism 
Objective (and comprehensive) conception of the 
human good: capabilities are to be promoted 
independently of people’s desires (because structures 
of inequalities and discrimination might distort what 
people have reason to choose and value). 
No conception of the human good: capabilities are to 
promoted because they are the means through which 
each human being will choose her own conception of 
the good. 
Perfectionism: one list of functionings that constitutes 
a good human living, and the object upon which 
human freedom will be exercised (but room for plural 
and local specification). There are constituents that all 
humans are sharing and find worthwhile whether one 
will choose those constituents as part of one’s life or 
not. 
Non-perfectionism: the list does not constitute a 
‘thick vague theory of the human good’ but presents 
elements that people, with different views of the good, 
can endorse as elements that will the most protect their 
liberty. 
Internalist essentialism: the constituents of a good 
human life are derived from an evaluative inquiry into 
what is the most worthwhile in a human life.  
Overlapping consensus: the list is the outcome of an 
overlapping consensus, it does not rest on a particular 
comprehensive theory of the good (it has to be noted 
that the list contains the same constituents as those 
generated by internalist essentialism). 
Liberalism: capabilities are the goal, people should be 
free to make use of the opportunities for functionings. 
Liberalism: capabilities are the goal, people should be 
free to make use of the opportunities for functionings. 
Capabilities as obligations: the government (and the 
citizens between them) has the moral obligations to 
promote central human capabilities. Each human being 
should have the opportunities to exercise the 
capabilities that constitute the objective theory of the 
good.  
Capabilities as rights: capabilities are the moral basis 
of central constitutional guarantees (whatever people’s 
conceptions of the good). The role of the state is to 
secure those rights, and by securing them, people 
would be free to pursue whatever life they want to 
lead. 
 
Can we think the capability approach within the context of a Rawlsian political 
liberalism rather than within the context of an Aristotelian social democracy? Is it sustainable 
to conceive development policies based on the capability approach developed in the context 
of a Rawlsian political liberalism? I will try to answer those questions on the basis of three 
main elements that characterise the change of context. A first main change with respect to her 
former Aristotelian social democracy perfectionism is that the list of basic capabilities does 
                                                 
12 This means that the theory of the good does not presuppose any particular comprehensive (religious, 
philosophical or moral) doctrine. It means that ‘it is elaborated from ideas implicit in the shared public political 
culture, and so does not depend upon the truth of any particular conception of what human life as a whole ought 
to be’ (Mulhall & Swift, 1996, p. 219). 
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not constitute anymore a single (though vague) conception of the good human life, but is a list 
upon which people who have different conceptions of the good life could agree upon in order 
to pursue their own conceptions of the good. Let us call that first change, the fear of being 
dictatorial about the good. A second main change of her approach is that her approach is 
framed for ‘political purposes only’. And finally, a third main change of her approach is that 
the central human capabilities constitute constitutional guarantees, or rights, that the 
government should promote instead of obligations that the government should meet. I will 
examine the relevance of each of those changes, and examine whether those changes better 
fulfil the aim of the capability approach-- to provide a sound normative basis for framing 
development policies, and for securing better human lives for all. 
 
c) The fears of paternalism 
 
Nussbaum’s approach claims to be liberal and to hold the fundamental view that ‘there 
is a distinctive human good expressed in the freedom we give our fellow citizens to make 
choices that we ourselves may hold to be profoundly wrong, unless it inflicts manifest harms 
on others’ (Nussbaum, 1998a, p. 336). Someone cannot be prevented from choosing against 
her own flourishing. If a person fails to choose to function in a certain way, then nobody can 
give incentives to change that person’s behaviour so that she chooses to function in the 
adequate way (as conceived by the paternalist public leader). Hence, interfering with 
someone’s freedom is only justified if the exercise of someone’s freedom impedes on 
someone else’s freedom or harms someone else (to respect Mill’s non-harm principle). The 
liberal sees it as perfectly legitimate to change people’s choices if the choice of a few prevents 
the choices of many. If for example, the choice of some to cultivate land, and to exercise the 
functionings of creating value, entails that others are unable to exercise that functioning, a 
liberal (such as Nussbaum) would advocate a land redistribution so that each human being 
could have the opportunity to create value. Hence, interfering in the choices of some, in this 
case an intervention that limits the production and acquisition of land by some landowners, 
would be justified.  
Though the liberal admits that the freedom of someone has to be restricted if it harms 
other people, the liberal recognises the right to do wrong to oneself. Yet, at a closer glance, it 
seems that Nussbaum’s liberalism admits a stronger form paternalism: interfering with 
someone’s choice is not only legitimate if that choice harms others, but interfering is justified 
when the choice harms the chooser herself. Nussbaum admits restricting people’s freedom to 
function the way they choose, going beyond the respect of Mill’s non-harm principle. There 
are some choices that she considers as wrong, setting the value of choice not so much in the 
choice itself but on the goodness of the object of choice. Nussbaum (2000b, p.53) writes: 
‘Any bill of rights is paternalistic [….], if paternalism means simply telling people that they 
cannot behave in some way that they have traditionally behaved and want to behave. The 
Indian Constitution is in that sense ‘paternalistic’, when it tells people that it is from now on 
illegal to treat women as unequal in matters of property, or to discriminate against people on 
grounds of cast or sex. More generally, any system of law is ‘paternalistic’, keeping some 
people from doing some things that they want to do. It is fully consistent to reject some forms 
of paternalism while supporting those that underwrite these central values’. Paternalism thus 
seems justified as the imposition of certain universal norms that every human being has to 
respect, whether she chooses those norms or not. And Nussbaum (2000b, p. 95) adds: ‘My 
own view is that health and bodily integrity are so important in relation to all the other 
capabilities that they are legitimate areas of interference with choice up to a point.’13  
                                                 
13 It is to be noted that, in her latest book summarising her capability approach, Nussbaum (2000b, Chapter Two) 
tries to reconcile her paternalistic, substantive account of the good with a desire approach to the human good. 
 12
Are there thus elements that are so important that interference is justified? If health 
and bodily integrity justify paternalist interventions because they are judged as too important 
as to be left to people’s choices, one could extend her argument to the other central human 
capabilities. If those are to be considered as what is most important in a human life, there is 
then no reason why knowledge and mental health for example, as being central to a human 
life, do not justify paternalistic intervention ‘with choice up to a point’.  This takes us back to 
the argument of freedom as one component, among others, of the human good. Paternalistic 
interventions are justified because health and knowledge are regarded as important as 
freedom. As Hurka (1993, p. 148) puts it: ‘No plausible value theory can treat free choice as 
the only intrinsic good. It must acknowledge some other goods, so that, for example, freely 
chosen creativity is better than freely chosen idleness, and autonomous knowledge is better 
than autonomous ignorance.’ And if all the central human functionings that appear on her list 
are domains where interference is legitimate ‘with choice up to a point’ because those are too 
central of a human life as to be left entirely to individual choices, then Nussbaum’s approach, 
as liberal as it claims to be, appears rather paternalistic and dictatorial about the good. Like 
Sen, Nussbaum argues that it is up to the democratic principles in each country to define the 
domain of interference (Nussbaum, 2000b, p. 95), but like Sen, she runs into the same 
problems by giving democratic principles the ultimate source of moral authority.   
There is another point where the switch to political liberalism shows similarities with 
her previous Aristotelian perfectionist position. If each human being, whatever her conception 
of the good life, can endorse those central human capabilities as essential to her life, whatever 
her life is, would it not mean that those capabilities are essential to any (good) human life, and 
thus constitute the fundamental basis of any human life? Is there not a fundamental set of 
capabilities inherent to any human life rather than instrumental capabilities to any conception 
of the good? Taking the case of bodily integrity, could it be viewed as instrumental to the 
pursuit of whatever conception of the good that the person might have? If a person has 
suffered a deep humiliation, both in her body and psyche (as in the case of rape), it seems 
inadequate to say that the injustice is a matter of that person being deprived of a means that 
has stripped her from pursuing her conception of the good. Rather, the injustice ‘consists in 
the very fact that her dignity as human being is being denied. She has been deprived of 
something good that is her due’ (Kraut, 1999, p. 328). To pursue justice is not ‘a matter of 
setting limits on how we treat each other and distributing all-purpose instruments’, like central 
human capabilities within political liberalism, but it ‘presupposes having a view about what is 
intrinsically good or bad’ (Kraut, 1999, p. 328). 
Withstanding from taking a position about what the good life is, and situating 
distributive justice at the level of a distribution of all purpose-means, does not seem to do 
much justice to those who have been denied central human capabilities. Whether one likes it 
or not, central human capabilities constitute a full-blooded (‘thick vague’) conception of the 
good (as has been argued earlier, though one would like in theory to avoid advancing a 
particular conception of the good, it is unavoidable in practice). And an account of the 
varieties of human lives is best done by recognising that single ‘thick vague’ conception of 
the good, whose elements one will prioritise and actualise differently according to the context 
in which one lives. In other words, the variety of lifestyles, rather than reflecting a variety in 
the conceptions of the good life, reflect a prioritisation of some elements and some 
actualisation of those elements of a single and same human life. Let us consider the following 
                                                                                                                                                        
She argues that an informed desire approach is necessary to ensure the stability of her substantive list (p. 152). 
The substantive list of central human capabilities could never be justified if human beings do not desire to 
endorse those capabilities, given the necessary information. Nussbaum tries to answer the charges of paternalism 
involved with an informed desire-supported substantive account of the good by stressing that capabilities are 
what matters, and so leaving the space for people to make choices that harm them (p. 161). 
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example. If a scholar, after spending more than ten years doing research, writing papers, 
going from conferences to conferences, decides to abandon his scholar life and nurse his sick 
wife suffering from cancer, and that after the death of his spouse, he settles himself down in a 
little village and begin to make furniture, to grow vegetables and to open a rehabilitation 
centre for drug-addicts.14 Can we say that, our former scholar has radically changed his 
conception of the good life twice? Can we say that he does not consider his life anymore as 
the actualisation of the capability to pursue knowledge, to create value in writing, that he does 
not consider anymore his life as the actualisation of the capability to pursue relationships of 
friendship by dedicating his time to his wife, but that he now considers his life as the 
actualisation of the capability to create value by making furniture and the actualisation of the 
capability to pursue relationships of friendship by dedicating his time to former drug-
addicted? Or can we say that he has simply kept the same conception of a (good) human life, 
and that he has given more importance to some elements rather than others during his lifetime 
(for example, a greater importance to the pursuit of knowledge than dedicating himself to his 
spouse), and that he has merely actualised differently the same elements during his lifetime 
(for example, creating value in making furniture and growing vegetables instead of creating 
value through academic writing). I rather believe that the variety of ways of life is not due to a 
variety in the conceptions of the good life than due to a different actualisation and 
prioritisation of different elements of a human life.15 And rather than affirming that the list of 
central human capabilities can be endorsed by people with different conceptions of the good, 
Nussbaum should rather affirm that the list of central human capabilities constitute a certain 
conception of the good human life (or rather a vague sketch of a good human life, or a ‘thick 
vague theory of the good’ as she once called it), and what will vary is only the prioritisation 
and ways of actualising the elements of that vague sketch.  
  
d) For political purposes only? 
 
Let us come to the second change that characterises the new context in which 
Nussbaum sets her capability approach, the emphasis put on the political purposes of the 
capability approach. She writes: ‘It is perfectly true that functionings, not simply capabilities, 
are what render a life fully human, in the sense that if there were no functioning of any kind in 
a life, we could hardly applaud it, no matter what opportunities it contained. Nonetheless, for 
political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities, and those alone’ (Nussbaum, 
2000b, p. 87). The capability approach is thus framed, according to Rawls’s definition of 
‘political purposes’, ‘to apply solely to the basic structure of society, its main political, social 
and economic institutions as a unified scheme of social co-operation; that it is presented 
independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine; and that it is 
elaborated in terms of fundamental ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 223). A capability approach for ‘political purposes only’ 
implies, according to Rawls’s definition, the following. First, it is intended to apply to the 
basic structure of society, which ‘comprises the main social institutions – the constitution, the 
                                                 
14 This example is a variation of the one in Finnis (1980, p. 93). 
15 One could object that the lives of for example Francis of Assisis and Marquis de Sade reflect two thoroughly 
distinct conceptions of the good, the former seeking intimacy with God by loving the poor and rejected of his 
society, the latter seeking intimacy with other human beings by psychically distorted forms of relationships. Yet, 
despite those thoroughly different lives, it is the same central human functioning that is being sought, the 
functioning of affiliation. Their respective lives do not reflect different conceptions of the good, but rather reflect 
the same fundamental human drive, the search for being loved, the search for intimacy with other beings, though 
actualised in different ways. There will obviously be better ways of actualising that same fundamental 
functioning of affiliation, of searching intimacy with other beings. And the capability approach cannot avoid in 
practice taking a stand on what are those better ways.  
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economic regime, the legal order and its specification of property and the like, and how these 
institutions cohere into one system’ (Rawls, 1993, p.301). So, churches, families, universities 
etc. are out of the basic structure of society and the capability approach does not apply to 
them. Second, the capability approach is ‘presented independently of any comprehensive 
doctrine’, that is, it is independent of any conception of the good and is silent about how 
people should lead their lives (so that each individual can be left free to live the life she 
chooses to). Finally, the capability approach is elaborated in terms of fundamental ideas 
viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. It is elaborated ‘as 
the systematic articulation of intuitive ideas that, because they are embedded in our society’s 
main institutions and the public traditions of their interpretation, can be regarded as implicitly 
shared’ (Mulhall & Swift, 1996, p. 172). It should by no means be seen as the elaboration of a 
particular comprehensive ideal.  
 Is it sustainable to put forward the capability approach for ‘political purposes only’? 
First, if the capability approach only applies for political purposes and only applies to basic 
structures of society, then universities are domains where the capability approach does not 
apply. In other words, the capability approach would tolerate that a woman cannot access to 
the post of rector at a university, since the university lies outside the domain where the 
capability approach can apply. Yet, Nussbaum argues that it should not be accepted that the 
rector of Notre Dame University can be a single man only, namely a priest, discriminating 
women and married men, and preventing them from accessing to a dignified job. Such 
discrimination should lead to the withdrawal of the university’s tax exemption (Nussbaum, 
2000a, pp. 228-9). As universities practising racial discrimination no longer enjoy tax-
exemption, so should universities practising gender discrimination: ‘with regard to a function 
that is administrative and educational, rather than at the core of worship, we should judge that 
granting a tax exemption involves the federal government in an unacceptable endorsement of 
sex inequality’ (Nussbaum, 2000b, p. 229). If universities lie outside the basic structure of 
society, gender discrimination should not be a problem.16 Second, a theory of justice ‘for 
political purposes only’ is silent about how people should live. However, we have seen that 
the capability approach is not neutral about how people should live, and can even be 
paternalist and impose a certain conception of the good life.17 Third, a theory of justice for 
‘political purposes only’ is not elaborated as a particular comprehensive ideal. And I come 
back here to the former point, the capability approach does offer a comprehensive vision of a 
good human life. And that vision rests on a particular philosophical doctrine, that goes beyond 
the different cultures and ways of life, there are elements that all human beings are sharing, 
and that they consider as good. What changes according to the context is not so much the 
conception of the good as the prioritisation and actualisation of the elements of that good. 
                                                 
16 Speaking of the family, Nussbaum (2000b, p. 270) acknowledges that it is a too important structure of society 
as to be left out from Rawls’s basic structure: ‘It [the family] has a very strong claim to be regarded as part of the 
basic structure of society, and among those institutions that basic principles of justice are designed to regulate 
most directly.’ But there is no reason why the other voluntary associations that Nussbaum mentions (2000b, p. 
271) and that are not part of Rawls’s basic structure, such as ‘churches and universities, professional or scientific 
associations, business firms or labour unions’, should not be institutions to which the capability approach ‘for 
political purposes only’ applies. 
17 For example, though she considers that it is the actual functions of sociability and of practical reason that make 
a life fully human, she stresses that, for political purposes, we should shoot for capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000a, 
p. 131). She argues that a public policy cannot prohibit someone to submit her life to a sect guru, and should not 
make sects illegal. If people ‘freely’ accept not to exercise their ability for practical reason, and let their lives be 
guided by a sect guru, this is fine, as far as the capability approach for ‘political purposes only’ is concerned, no 
matter the alienating consequences that the sect might have upon that person. I fear that such a capability 
approach risks being sued for non-assistance to an endangered person. This is probably why she ‘understands 
well why a comprehensive perfectionist doctrine, such as that of the young Marx, might say this [that it is the 
function of practical reason, not simply the capability, that makes a life fully human’ (Nussbaum, 2000a, p. 131). 
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I would say that, yes, the capability approach only applies for political purposes, but 
for political purposes in its original meaning. The political, in its original definition of the 
domain of affairs of the polis, is the domain of the good living together. The polis, in its 
original Greek meaning, is a community of people deliberating together for the sake of the 
good and taking actions towards that good (Politics 1252a1-6, 1280b30-40; Nicomachean 
Ethics 1103b2-6)  Therefore, being ‘political’ means having the capability to communicate 
and deliberate about what is good and about the actions to be done towards that good (Miller, 
1995; Yack, 1993). In that context, justice for ‘political purposes only’ would mean that, by 
living together in a polis, people have a common responsibility, have mutual obligations 
towards one another, of securing the conditions for ‘living well together’, of ensuring that 
each citizen within the polis has the opportunity to live a good human life. And this leads me 
to the third characteristic of Nussbaum’s Rawlsian turn, the emphasis put on capabilities as 
rights instead of mutual obligations that people have towards one another. 
 
e) Capabilities as constitutional guarantees? 
 
Framed within the context of a Rawlsian political liberalism, the capability approach 
provides the basis for constitutional principles that citizens can request from their 
government, whereas framed within the context of an Aristotelian social democracy, the 
capability approach provided the basis for mutual obligations that people had towards one 
another. It might seem irrelevant to discuss the legitimacy of giving priority to constitutional 
guarantees rather than political obligations, since there is no right without corresponding 
obligation, and no obligation without corresponding right. Yet, considering capabilities in 
terms of constitutional guarantees that humans can claim rather than in terms of mutual 
obligations that humans owe to one another, is not as innocent as it might first appear. In her 
‘Prelude Towards a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind’, Simone Weil (1952, p. 3) 
writes: ‘The notion of obligations comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and 
relative to the former. A right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to 
which it corresponds, the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual who 
possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being under certain obligations 
towards him. Recognition of an obligation makes it effectual. An obligation which goes 
unrecognised by anybody loses none of the full force of its existence. A right which goes 
unrecognised by anybody is not worth very much’. And it is therefore that the central human 
capabilities should be seen not as rights, but as mutual obligations to satisfy. In considering 
human capabilities as obligations, one puts the emphasis on the actions required to fulfil those 
obligations, whereas considering human capabilities as rights puts the emphasis on a claim 
that nobody is specified to respond to. Justice, in order to be fully realized, starts from the 
question ‘What ought I (or we) do?’, it starts from the perspective of obligations, rather than 
starting from the question ‘What ought I (or we) get?’, rather than starting from the 
perspective of rights (O’Neill, 2000, p. 199).18 
Therefore, it is important whether capabilities exist within the context of a Rawlsian 
political liberalism or within the context of an Aristotelian social democracy:  
‘In the first perspective [that of the individuals bearer of rights], all the obligations 
with respect to the community are conditional, i.e., relative to a revocable consent of the 
individual. In the second perspective [that of the individuals bearer of obligations], those 
obligations are irrevocable, for the sole reason that only the mediation of the community of 
belonging allows the human potentialities to flourish. If the individual only considers herself 
originally as bearer of rights, she will hold the association and all the ensuing duties as a mere 
                                                 
18 O’Neill (2000, p.125) also emphasises that while ‘rights specify what is to be received; obligations also 
specify who is to provide it.’ 
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instrument of security under which she will be able to pursue her selfish aims, and she will 
consider her participation as conditional and revocable. If, in the contrary, she holds herself as 
indebted from her birth to institutions that alone will allow her to become a free agent, then 
she will consider herself as obliged with respect to those institutions, and particularly obliged 
to render those institutions accessible to others.’ Ricoeur (1991, p. 163) 
 
Capabilities are not only positive freedoms that each human being exercises towards 
herself, but are also positive freedoms that each human being exercises towards fellow-human 
beings. Each individual is not so much born as bearer of rights to live a dignified human life 
as bearer of obligations towards others to allow them to live a human life, obligations to 
provide what is lacking in the lives of others.  
And it is precisely from a lack of central human capabilities that a policy is 
implemented – a lack of having access to knowledge, a lack of having access to adequate 
health services, etc. It is only from the awareness of a lack in a dignified human life that a 
policy can be implemented in order to suppress that lack. Since, ‘it is from a complain that we 
penetrate the domain of the just and unjust. The sense of injustice is not only more striking, 
but also more adequate than a sense of justice; because justice is often what is lacking and 
injustice what is reigning, and humans have a clearer vision of what is lacking to human 
relationships than the right way of organizing them. It is the injustice that sets thought in 
motion’ (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 177). Only in shifting from a conception of the just in terms of 
rights towards a conception of the unjust in terms of obligations to put an end to injustice, 
could the freedom for all to live as human beings be fully ensured. If the capability approach 
really wants to provide a normative framework so that policies can be taken that allow each 
human being live a dignified human life, it will have to think the capabilities not as 
philosophical basis for constitutional guarantees, but as philosophical basis of obligations that 
all humans have towards one another through the mediation of institutions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have to acknowledge that, at the hour of undertaking policies, it is only by 
recognising what makes human life a good human life, or rather only by recognising what is 
lacking to a full human life, that actions are undertaken. No development policy can be 
neutral with respect to a conception of the good. It is because it is recognised that 
malnutrition is a deep offence to a dignified human life that actions can be undertaken to put 
an end to it. It is because it has been recognised that domination and humiliation are a deep 
offence to a life worthy of being human that actions can be undertaken to put an end to 
structures of domination and humiliation. Policies that aim at letting people function in a full 
human way can only be undertaken on the basis of a perfectionist conception of the good, on 
the basis of the characteristics or excellences of a human life that is worth living, or rather on 
the basis of what is lacking of such a life. And it is only in recognising fully those excellences 
that human beings will be able to be free, free to live a dignified human life.  
If development policies based on a perfectionist theory of the good seem paternalist, 
seem to restrict people’s freedom to live the way they choose, so much the better, since that 
type of paternalism is nothing more than the refusal to see another person suffering from not 
being able to live a human life. And that paternalism as non-indifference to the suffering of 
people lacking the conditions for living dignified human lives is nothing more than respect 
for people in their choices of living a worthy human life. Far from being a restriction on 
people’s freedom, adopting policies guided by a perfectionist conception of the human good 
is the very condition for people to be free to live as dignified human beings. 
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